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ABSTRACT
In this paper we compare various characteristics of the cross-country transmission of shocks in
the financial markets of both advanced and emerging countries during two periods of globalization -- the
pre-World War I classical gold standard era, 1880-1914, and the post-Bretton Woods era, 1975-2000.
Based on principal components analysis on monthly spreads on long-term sovereign bond yields and on
an EMP measure of currency crises, an index of global stress, and impulse response functions from VARs
estimated using weekly data on short-term interest rates, we conclude that financial market shocks were
more globalized before 1914 compared to the present. We postulate that this difference in systemic
stability between the two eras of globalization reflects factors such as strong cross-country
interdependence fostered through links to gold, the growing financial maturity of advanced countries, and
the widening of the center to include a more diverse group of countries spanning several regions.
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1. Introduction 
This paper contrasts the pattern of transmission of shocks under the pre-World War I 
classical gold standard, between 1880 and 1914, with that in the post-Bretton Woods era, 
between 1975 and 2000.   
The international transmission of financial distress and financial crises is not new 
(Kindleberger 1978), but the propensity for shocks to be communicated across countries 
and the manner in which they have been transmitted has changed.  This may reflect 
among other factors, differences in the exchange rate regime, the extent of financial 
integration, and the development of financial institutions.  Thus a contrast of the pattern 
in the transmission of shocks then versus now helps us understand the consequences of 
these changes in the international monetary system.
1 
We compare the recent period to the pre-1914 era because it was the previous era of 
international financial globalization.  The extent of international financial integration 
before World War I according to several metrics was comparable to today (Bordo 2002, 
Obstfeld and Taylor 2002).  Moreover along with globalization, the incidence of financial 
crises, especially currency crises involving emerging countries was comparable to today 
(Bordo et al 2001). 
Although there were similarities in the economic environments of the two eras of 
globalization there were also several key differences which could explain the differences 
in the patterns of transmission of shocks that we find in this study. 
First, most countries in the pre-1914 era, adhered to the fixed exchange rates of the 
classical gold standard.  In the absence of gold flows, in today’s era of managed floating 
and soft pegs, transmission would occur via other channels. 
Second, prior to World War I, the commercial and financial centers of the world were 
concentrated in a few countries in Western Europe, while the emergers consisted 
primarily of countries of new settlement (the U.S., Canada, Australia and Argentina) and 
                                                 
1 Recently a number of studies have attempted to develop these contrasts.  See for instance, Bordo et. al. 
(2001), Mauro et. al. (2002), Murshid (2001), Neal and Weidenmier (2001) and Eichengreen (2001).  4
the European periphery.  This implied that there were naturally strong ties between these 
satellite countries and the center.  Today a more diverse group of countries spanning 
several regions constitute the advanced countries.  Similarly diverse are the emerging 
countries.  Consequently today’s emerging counties are subject to varied influences, from 
a more diverse set of advanced countries.  The center-periphery relationships that existed 
in the pre-1914 era, can be thought of in terms of a model of an atom; a single nucleus 
with orbiting electrons.  It is less clear that such an analogy could be extended to describe 
the relationships between today’s advanced and emerging countries. 
Finally, the pre-1914 advanced countries had not completely developed the tools to 
provide financial stability, such as an effective lender of last resort, moreover adherence 
to gold convertibility and the attendant imperative to protect gold reserves dominated all 
other objectives (Eichengreen 1992); as a consequence, shocks in the past had harsher 
repercussions (Bordo et. al. 2001).  The severity of the downturns which accompanied the 
negative shocks to financial markets, amplified their cross-border impact.  Today better 
policies and improved financial systems limit the severity of shocks and minimize their 
international impact. 
Our analysis is divided into three parts.  First using principal components analysis, we 
examine the international co-movement in monthly long-term government bond yield 
spreads and exchange market pressure indices.  Spreads can be viewed as evidence of 
stress in financial markets, while exchange market pressure (EMP) indexes are often used 
as a measure of currency crises (see for instance Eichengreen et. al. 1996, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999).  Our narrow treatment of crises, which emphasizes currency crises as 
opposed to banking crises, reflects the difficulties that are involved in constructing a 
metric of banking crises similar to an exchange market pressure index.   
Second, we develop a global crisis index as the common or shared component in 
exchange market pressure across countries.  Using simple frequencies and extreme value 
methods, we are then able to estimate the likelihood of a global crisis during each era.    5
Finally we estimate a number of VARs using weekly data on short-term interest rates, 
and use impulse response functions to identify the direction and impact of financial 
shocks between individual countries. 
Our principal findings are the following: 
•   There is strong evidence of international co-movement in spreads during both eras, 
however in recent years this correspondence is concentrated more within groups, 
separated into advanced and emerging categories. 
•   The international co-movement in EMP indices is weaker than the pattern found for 
spreads.  Across the two periods however, there is stronger global co-movement in the 
pre-1914 era.  In contrast today there is strong co-movement within the group of 
advanced countries, and within the emerging countries there is strong intra-regional 
co-movement. 
•   The likelihood of a global crisis was higher in the pre 1914 era, although the 
probability of international crises within the advanced countries is about as high today 
as it was in the past. 
•   Financial shocks before 1914 were largely transmitted in one direction—from the 
advanced countries of Europe (especially the U.K.) to the emergers.  Today while 
shocks are transmitted internationally within advanced countries, evidence of 
transmission from advanced to emerging countries is weaker than in the pre-1914 era. 
A number of implications follow from our results.  First, during both eras, tight 
integration fostered strong interdependence in financial variables between nations.  Under 
the classical gold standard, the degree of this dependence increased over time as countries 
became more integrated and as global trends in price levels sparked a decline in spreads.  
Moreover the pattern of co-movement observed suggests that shocks were often 
communicated across regions and across the groups of advanced and emerging countries.  
In contrast, in recent years, advanced- and emerging-country-spreads have reacted 
differently to outbreaks of instability.  Perhaps as a consequence of de-leveraging and  6
wake-up-call effects, crashes in asset prices in emerging markets have spilled over far 
beyond their epicenters, affecting capital market access for emerging countries as a 
group.  However, advanced countries have been largely insulated from these 
disturbances.  These results based on a sample containing both advanced and emerging 
countries contrast somewhat with those found by Mauro et. al. (2002) in their analysis of 
emerging market spreads in historical perspective, which suggests that financial stress 
between emerging countries has increased today compared to the pre-1914 era. 
Second, the world is generally a more stable place today; crises are less likely to have 
global reach relative to the pre-1914 era.  This is perhaps not a surprising finding.  The 
pre-1914 gold standard was characterized by a system of fixed exchange rates, a 
concentration of financial and commercial power in a handful of European countries, and 
relatively weak financial markets even in the advanced countries.  Hence, countries were 
neither insulated from shocks nor capable of accommodating these shocks.   
Second, although today’s advanced countries have developed the tools to provide greater 
financial stability, shocks have still been communicated through the fixed exchange rates 
of the European Monetary System, and through other channels.  Thus speculative attacks 
on currencies have not been avoided, however we posit that today’s advanced countries 
are better-able to accommodate these shocks, consequently the output-effect of these 
crises have been smaller (Bordo et. al. 2001).  In contrast, in the pre-1914 era, banking 
and currency crises often gave rise to virulent twin crises.  These sharp negative shocks to 
the center then sent impulses through the gold standard world wreaking havoc at the 
periphery. 
Third the regional pattern of crisis-transmission within the emerging countries seems to 
suggest the importance of trade channels (Glick and Rose 1999) however it also 
underscores the vulnerability of emerging countries to financial shocks.  This inability of 
emerging countries to insulate their economies from negative shocks reflects not just the 
failure of macro-policies, but weaknesses in the banking and financial structure.  Yet, 
while financial distress exhibits a common pattern across emerging countries (Mauro et. 
al. 2002), emerging-country crises are overwhelmingly regional.  An explanation may be  7
that when international capital markets tighten, as measured by the volume, cost and 
maturity of funds, their impact is most acute in the region in which the crisis originates 
(Eichengreen et. al. 2001), consequently whether or not strong intra-regional linkages 
between emerging countries can be identified, crises are likely to be regional 
(Eichengreen 2001). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we discuss the data and 
our empirical methodology.  Section 3 examines the evidence in the cross-country co-
movement in bond yield spreads and an index of exchange market pressure.  In section 4, 
we present estimates on the likelihood of a global currency crisis under the classical gold 
standard and more recently in the post-Bretton Woods era.  In section 5, we use vector 
autoregressions to trace the impact of innovations in interest rates in one country on 
another.  Finally, in section 6, we provide some conclusions. 
 
2. Data  and  Methodology 
2.1. Data 
We utilize data on short-term interest rates, long-term government bond yields and bond 
yield spreads, as well as data on exchange rates and reserves.  These data were available 
at a monthly frequency, and in some instances at a weekly frequency. 
For the pre-World War I period, we utilize data, although not necessarily for each series, 
for 15 countries, including five advanced countries—Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands and the UK—and ten emerging countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, 
Denmark, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the US.
2 
Our data on short-term interest rates, which are open market rates on three month bills, 
are available for the European countries and the US.  These data, which are available at a 
                                                 
2 As in Bordo and Schwartz (1996), we classify the US as an emerging country however this classification 
is borderline at best.  While the US was a net borrower during the first half of the gold standard era, by the 
turn of the century the US had become a net creditor.  Though still lacking a lender of last resort, financial 
markets in the US were highly developed.  Moreover per capita income levels were higher than those in the 
UK.  However, for our purposes it does not matter whether we treat the US as an advanced country, or as 
an emerging country, in as much as our results are qualitatively unaffected.  8
weekly frequency, were compiled from various issues of the Economist Magazine by 
Neal and Weidenmier (2001).  In addition, our interest rate data includes a monthly series 
on open market rates for Argentina.  In most instances these data span a 34 year period 
from 1880 to 1914. 
Our data on long-term sovereign bond yields and their spreads over UK consols,
3 as well 
as our data on exchange rates, are available for the majority of the countries in our 
sample, including the Latin American countries, and in most instances span the period of 
investigation. However, our data on reserves, collected from the Economist Magazine, 
are only available for six countries—Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the UK and the 
US.  
For the post-Bretton Woods period the sample includes 23 countries.  This includes five 
of the G7 countries—France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US—as well as Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, and 15 emerging countries—Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, 
Chile, Hungary, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Singapore, the 
Slovak Republic, Thailand, and Venezuela.   
With some exceptions, data on exchange rates, short-term interest rates (call money rates 
where available, discount rates otherwise), and reserves, observed at a monthly 
frequency, are available from 1975 to 2000.
4  Our weekly data on short-term interest rates 
are typically available only for the 1990s.
5  Moreover our data on emerging market bond 
yield spreads (over long-term—30-year—US Treasuries), are very limited, along both 
cross-sectional and time dimensions.  Our sample includes six emerging countries—
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and Poland—for which data are available 
from October 1994 onward.  In addition, we have data on long-term government bond 
                                                 
3 These data were obtained from Batley and Ferguson (1999), Neal and Weidenmier (2001), and Global 
Financial Data: http://www.globalfindata.com.  As yields were typically not reported, they were calculated 
by dividing the price of the bond by its coupon. 
4 These data were taken from the International Financial Statistics, CD ROM version. 
5 These data, which are available from Global Financial Data: http://www.globalfindata.com are domestic 
interbank Eurocurrency rates with a maturity of 1-3 months.  9
yields for four advanced countries—France, Germany, Japan, and the UK—for which we 
compute spreads over US Treasuries.
6 
2.2. Methodology 
We employ a variety of techniques including principal components analysis, cluster 
analysis, extreme value methods, and vector autoregressions, to examine the strength of, 
and patterns in the transmission of shocks, and currency crises.  Each approach brings 
with it a different angle from which we can view the data.  When brought together we can 
hope for a panoramic perspective that reveals some of the many facets of “transmission,” 
which either directly or indirectly relates to the international transmission of financial 
crises. 
Below we discuss the various techniques that we employ in greater detail. 
2.2.1. Examining the Extent of, and Patterns in, Dependence: 
Principal Components Analysis
7 
Using principal components analysis and monthly data, we examine the cross-country co-
movement in bond yield spreads and an index of exchange market pressure (the 
construction and significance of this index is discussed below). 
In essence, principal components analysis linearly transforms a set of correlated variables 
into a smaller subset of uncorrelated variables, in a manner that aims to capture most of 
the variation in the data.  For any given p variables, we can extract p principal 
components.  However, all p principal components are rarely reported.  The p principal 
components are ordered by the fraction of the total variance that they explain.  When a 
set of variables are highly correlated, we can expect that the bulk of the variation in the 
data can be attributed to the first principal component alone.  Hence the fraction of the 
variance that can be attributed to the first principal component provides a good measure 
of the overall degree of co-movement in the data. 
                                                 
6 The Data for the advanced countries are available in International Financial Statistics, CD ROM version.  
For the emerging countries these data can be obtained from Datastream. 
7 Throughout we use the term “dependence” loosely, associating measures of linear association with 
dependence.  10
While the first principal component is usually interpreted as a measure of overall co-
movement, the “higher-order” principal components often provide evidence of 
dependence within groups.  To identify these groups we plot the factor loadings 
corresponding to the first three principal component vectors.  These are simply the 
correlations between the variables and the principal components.
8 
In Figure 1, we plot the factor loadings from a hypothetical example.  Three distinct 
groups are apparent.  Group one sets itself apart by virtue of its strong positive 
association with the first principal component, while group two is differentiated from 
group one, through a strong correlation with the second principal component.  Finally 
group-three-membership entails high correlations with the third principal component. 
In our hypothetical example the divisions between the three groups are clearly visible.  In 
practice, the separation across groups may not be so obvious.  Thus we employ a 
clustering algorithm to categorize countries into different clusters.
9  T h i s  w o r k s  b y  
minimizing the “distance” between members of a group, while maximizing the distance 
across separate groups.  That countries are clustered together may suggest a pattern of 
dependence that is common to that group.  At the same time, it is important to realize that 
countries may be clustered into a group, not because they are strongly correlated with 
each other, but because the common element within that group is a weak or negative 
association with the rest of the sample.  It is therefore important to examine the strength 
of correlations within each group with each of the principal components, rather than 
conjecturing as to a likely pattern of behavior based on cluster membership alone. 
                                                 
8 An often used strategy for identifying separate groups, or factors, involves rotating the axes so as to 
emphasize differences across groups.  This is not a strategy that we pursue here since the differences across 
groups are usually clear in a plot of the un-rotated factor loadings.  When they are not, we employ a 
clustering algorithm to isolate the various groups (see discussion below). Moreover, our goal is more than 
simply to identify various groups.  Additionally we wish to understand the salient characteristics in the 
pattern of behavior within each group. To this end, the un-rotated factor loadings themselves contain useful 
information that can be exploited. 
9 The use of cluster analysis takes some of the arbitrariness out of the task of identifying patterns in co-
movement.  However, the method is not without its drawbacks.  In particular, the number of clusters needs 
to be defined a priori—in this case countries were always divided into three separate clusters.  As a 
consequence the clustering algorithm may force a separation of countries into different groups even when 
there are no significant differences between them.  11
2.2.2. Constructing an Index of Exchange Market Pressure 
To provide some evidence on crisis-transmission, we construct, for each country, a 
measure of currency crises, and examine the degree of, and patterns in, the co-movement 
of this variable.  Our measure of currency crises is an index of exchange market pressure, 
which has been widely used in the literature (see for instance Eichengreen et. al. 1996, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).
10  We estimate an exchange market pressure index for 
each country as a weighted average of movements in the exchange rate, the foreign 
interest rate differential and reserves.
11  The exchange rate and the foreign interest rate 
differential are measured relative to a center country.  For the pre-World War I period, 
the UK was chosen as this center country, and for the recent period, the US was the 
natural choice. 
The weights are based on the reciprocal of the standard deviation of each series, divided 
by the sum of the reciprocal of the standard deviations of all three series.  Thus the 
weights are assigned in a manner such that no one series dominates the index and so as to 
ensure that the weights sum to one.  The resulting index was then normalized to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
12 
2.2.3. Estimating the Probability of Crises: Extreme Value Methods 
As a complement to our analysis of the degree of global dependence in financial 
variables, we estimate the probability of a global currency crisis.  As in Murshid (2001), 
we identify global currency crises as extreme values of an index which captures the 
degree of exchange market pressure that is common to all countries.
13  Specifically this 
                                                 
10 The original exchange market pressure model, due to Girton and Roper (1977), was suggested as a 
measure of money market disequilibrium. 
11 The availability of data dictated whether all three variables could be utilized to construct this index.  For 
some countries the index for the prewar period was constructed using data on the interest rate and exchange 
rate movements only and not on reserve changes, due to a lack of reserves data at a monthly frequency. 
12 In those countries that had experienced hyperinflations, normalizing by the historic mean and standard 
deviation, limited the usefulness of the EMP-index during periods of more moderate inflation.  To avoid 
this problem Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggest separating periods of high and low inflation, and 
constructing EMP indexes for each sub-period.  This approach was modified to allow for the volatility of 
inflation rates by standardizing the EMP index using a rolling mean and standard deviation. 
13 In Mody and Taylor (2002), the common component in exchange market pressure is interpreted as a 
measure of contagion, where the term “contagion” is used in a broad sense, as a “catch-all” of the cross-
country dependence in exchange market pressure.  12
index is the first principal component of the exchange market pressure data.  Some 
sensitivity analyses using Kalman filtering techniques yielded similar results. 
To obtain estimates of the probability of global crises, we used two different 
methodologies.  First, the probability of a global crisis was estimated as simply the 
frequency of global crises, where exceedances by our index, over a particular threshold, 
were associated with global crises. 
The second approach involved fitting the appropriate distribution to the right tail of the 
global stress index by using extreme value methods.  This involved using a six-month 
window to de-cluster the observations,
14 and then selecting the maxima within these 
windows with which we estimate the distribution of extreme values in the global crisis 
index for both regimes.
15  See Murshid (2001) for details and references cited therein. 
2.2.4. Examining Cross-Country Inter-Linkages: VAR Analysis 
While principal components analysis sheds light on the patterns in cross-country 
interdependence, it does not account for all of the complex dynamics and inter-
relationships that may exist between countries.  To better understand these relationships, 
we estimate vector autoregressions using data on short-term interest rates. 
By estimating impulse response functions from these VARs, we were able to trace the 
impact of a shock in one country on another, and thus shed light on the direction of 
shocks and the degree to which they impacted on other countries. 
The difficulty with estimating impulse response functions however is that it necessarily 
requires that we impose an ad hoc assumption regarding the order in which shocks are 
communicated across countries.  This can have a significant bearing on our results.   
However, the ordering of the variables is more likely to be an issue when the data is of a 
lower frequency and there are a large number of variables in our system.  Thus we limit 
our system to no more than six countries, and use weekly data, in order to sidestep these 
difficulties. 
                                                 
14 By “de-clustering” we mean to remove or lessen the serial dependence across observations over time. 
15 Specifically, we use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of a generalized 
extreme value distribution to the data, (see Embrechts et. al. 1996).  13
 
3.  Patterns in Crisis Transmission: The Co-Movement in 
Spreads and Exchange Market Pressure 
In this section, we apply principal components analysis to examine the extent of cross-
country dependence, in spreads on sovereign debt and proxies for currency crises, 
observed at a monthly frequency.  We present our results in two sets of figures. 
The first set of figures is simply a plot of the variance attributed to the first three principal 
components.  The second set of figures, plot the factor loadings corresponding to the first 
three principal component vectors.   
3.1.  Analysis of Spreads 
Our analysis of spreads for the prewar period from 1880-1914, covers a sample of 
thirteen countries.
16  The corresponding analysis for the recent period focuses on a sample 
of ten countries over a narrower window from October 1994 to October 2000.
17  Below 
we summarize the main findings of our analysis and then conjecture as to their 
implications. 
3.1.1. Main Findings 
A simple time series plot suggests a strong pattern of global co-movement in spreads in 
both the pre-1914 era and more recently (Figures 2A and 2B).  In both samples the first 
principal component captures approximately 60% of the total variation in the data (see 
Figure 3).  This has two implications.  First, the degree of co-movement is roughly 
similar across the two periods.  Second, the bulk of the variation that we observe in 
spreads can be attributed to global factors, although this does not preclude the possibility 
of important influences on spreads, which are either specific to countries or a subset of 
countries. 
                                                 
16 Specifically our sample includes four advanced countries—Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands—and nine emerging countries—Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain, and the US. 
17 The countries in our sample include four advanced—France, Germany, Japan and the UK—and six 
emerging countries—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Poland.  14
The findings for the pre-1914 era however mask significant differences between the first 
and second half of that period.  The period, from 1880 to 1896 was characterized by 
global deflation.  During that episode cross-country associations in spreads were 
relatively weak.  In contrast in the subsequent period from 1897 to 1914, characterized by 
global inflation, there is a clear convergence in spreads across both advanced and 
emerging countries.  These shifting patterns implied stronger dependence in the latter half 
of the gold standard era, when compared to the period as a whole (Figure 3). 
As noted above, much of the co-movement in spreads during either era can be attributed 
to the first principal component however there is still a significant degree of “residual” 
co-movement, which is captured by principal components two and three.  For the pre-
1914 sample there are no clear patterns to this co-movement (see Figure 4A and 4B).  In 
contrast, in the 1990s, sharp distinctions between advanced and emerging countries vis-à-
vis the pattern in co-movement in spreads are apparent.  This is evident from Figure 2B, 
which plots the spreads data for the recent period, and from Figure 4C, which plots the 
factor loadings from principal components analysis. 
Within the group of emerging countries, the salient characteristics have been sharp global 
spikes in spreads in the aftermath of emerging market crises.  However, the advanced 
countries have been largely insulated from these events; instead spreads have followed a 
downward trend.  These contrasting experiences effectively split the sample cleanly into 
two groups, with the first principal component capturing the highly volatile response of 
emerging-market spreads during crisis episodes, and the second and third principal 
components capturing the long-run patterns in advanced-country spreads.  An implication 
of this is that the degree of co-movement within either the group of advanced or the 
group of emerging countries is understated in a broader sample that includes both.  Thus 
the conclusion in Mauro et. al. (2002), that spreads were more tightly correlated in the 
1990s, compared to the pre-1914 era, reflects their focus on emerging countries. 
3.1.2. Summary and Implications 
Both in the past and more recently yield spreads on sovereign debt have depicted a 
pattern of tight international co-movement, however while the degree of co-movement  15
has been roughly similar across the two periods, the pattern of co-movement across the 
two periods has differed.   
In the prewar era, in particular from 1897 to 1914, the dominant characteristic was a 
worldwide decline in the mean and variance of spreads (see Figure 2A).  This reflected 
both tighter co-movement across countries made possible through greater financial 
integration (Bordo and Rockoff 1996, Neal and Weidenmier 2001), and an easing of 
sovereign debt burdens consequent upon the global increase in price levels (Flandreau et. 
al. 1998). 
Though observed over a shorter period, a similar pattern of declining spreads is evident in 
today’s advanced countries.  These nonstationary or trend components in the data 
underlie the strong long-run associations in advanced-country-spreads.   
In contrast, no trends are evident in emerging-market-spreads; instead the bulk of the 
variation in the data can be attributed to sharp spikes, corresponding to a tightening of 
international capital markets, in the aftermath of crises.  Hence what underlies the strong 
correspondence in emerging-market-spreads is the tendency for financial distress to 
explode across emerging markets as a whole, when risk perceptions shift in the face of 
financial disturbances.  Motivating these discrete shifts in risk perceptions is imperfect 
information, which itself can reflect both institutional weaknesses in financial systems in 
emerging countries, as well as the type of capital inflows that emerging countries are 
attempting to attract. 
The explosive pattern of financial distress in emerging countries has been interpreted as 
providing evidence for the global scope of, possibly contagious, financial crises.  But it is 
important to emphasize that the pattern of transmission of financial stress, as captured by 
the international co-movement in spreads, should not be thought of as equivalent to the 
pattern in crisis-transmission, which in turn represents more severe reactions to foreign 
shocks.  While the ability of emerging countries to withstand these shocks may be 
questionable, it needs to be remembered that the tightening of international capital 
markets which accompany periods of stress are often short-lived.  Indeed recent 
experience suggests that spreads in emerging countries will usually return to their pre- 16
crisis levels relatively quickly as will private capital flows, especially in regions which 
have been unaffected by crises (Eichengreen et. al. 2001).  In order to better understand 
the pattern of crisis-transmission, below we present evidence on the cross-country 
dependence in EMP indexes.   
3.2.  Analysis of Exchange Market Pressure 
Both the pre-1914 and post-Bretton Woods samples include ten countries, with a similar 
mix, consisting of four advanced countries and six emergers.
 18  
3.2.1. Main Findings 
In relation to the extent of global dependence in the spreads data, the associations across 
countries, measured vis-à-vis the degree of exchange market pressure, are far weaker, 
however, the degree of co-movement is greater for the pre-1914 era (Figure 5). 
During both periods the pattern of co-movement varies across advanced and emerging 
countries (Figure 6A).  In the pre-1914 era, a plot of the factor loadings separates the two 
groups.  But we need to be careful as to what distinguishes the group of advanced 
countries from the group of emerging countries.  Importantly both advanced and 
emerging countries exhibit strong correlations with the first principal component, which 
in turn implies positive correlations across these groups.  The distinguishing 
characteristic is that the group of emerging countries is negatively correlated with the 
second principal component, which with the exception of the Netherlands, is not a 
characteristic shared by advanced countries.  This could be picking up the effect of crises 
within emerging countries that did not filter through to the core countries of Europe, or 
the channel could have also operated in reverse, with minor localized disturbances 
affecting the advanced nations of Europe, but not reaching the periphery. 
The evidence for the recent period suggests a more pronounced pattern of separation 
between advanced and emerging countries.  The key characteristic of the advanced group 
is a strong positive correlation with the first principal component, which indicates not 
                                                 
18 The advanced countries in our pre-1914 sample are Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands and 
the six emerging countries are Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Japan, and the US.  For the post-Bretton 
Woods sample the advanced countries are France, Germany, Japan and the UK and the emerging countries 
are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.  17
only that there was strong co-movement within this group, but that overall a larger 
proportion of the variance in the EMP indices can be attributed to the advanced countries 
than to any other group.  However, advanced-emerging country associations are not 
completely absent.  In particular, the Asian countries exhibit weak, but positive, 
correlations with the first principal component (Figure 6B).  Hence there is some 
evidence to indicate that crises affecting the advanced countries may have had 
repercussions for the Asian countries.  In contrast however there is little indication of a 
pattern of dependence between the advanced countries and the Latin American countries. 
In addition, the pattern of dependence within today’s emergers, suggests intra-regional 
co-movement (Figure 6B, see also evidence in Hartmann et. al. 2002) picked up by the 
second and third principal components.
19 
3.2.2. Summary and Implications 
During both periods, the extent of cross-country dependence in a proxy for currency 
crises is significantly lower than what is observed for spreads.  Thus while financial 
stress has spilled over relatively easily, financial crises have not.  Of the two eras, the 
extent of crisis-transmission has been somewhat greater in the pre-1914 era.  Despite 
some differences in their patterns of dependence, the co-movement of advanced and 
emerging country EMP indices suggests the presence of inter-linkages across these two 
groups.  The underlying theme seems to have been one of “muted” global, rather than 
regional, co-movement across countries.  In contrast, the association between advanced 
and emerging countries in recent years has been far weaker.  Moreover, emerging market 
crises have rarely been global and have suggested instead a pronounced regional pattern. 
 
4.  Incidence of Global Crises 
In this section, as a complement to our earlier analysis, we examine the incidence of 
global currency crises in the two periods.  In addition, we group countries into advanced 
and emerging, and examine the incidence of international crises within these groups. 
                                                 
19 We observe similar patterns in samples differing in size, in the period of investigation, and in the 
composition of countries.  18
We use a global-crisis index (see section 2.2.3, and Figures 7A and 7B) to estimate the 
probability of these events over any six month period.  Our (global) crisis-index, which is 
simply the first principal component of the EMP data,
20 aims to capture the common or 
shared-element in exchange market pressure across the countries in our sample.
21  To 
examine the incidence of shared or common crises within particular groups of countries, 
we construct, in a similar fashion, a crisis-index for each group. 
Global crises were defined in terms of our global-crisis index.  Specifically values in 
excess of ten—the total variance in our sample—were defined as global crises.  For the 
purposes of comparison across regimes, however, the actual value of the threshold is 
unimportant and we continue to use ten as our crisis-threshold for the smaller samples.
22  
The incidence of global crises was then obtained as simply a frequency of “exceedances” 
above this crisis-threshold.  Additionally, we used extreme value methods to fit the 
appropriate distribution to the right tail of our global-crisis index (see Murshid 2001 for 
details). 
The results are presented in two tables.  Table 1 reports the incidence of global crises for 
both periods, while Table 2, reports the incidence of international crises within each of 
the sets of advanced, and emerging, countries. 
However we measure the incidence of global crises, we find that the probability of a 
global crisis in recent years has been considerably lower than that during the earlier 
period.  In particular, the probability of a global crisis over any six-month period, during 
the prewar era, was more than three times as high as the probability of observing similar 
values of stress in the more recent period. 
This result contrasts with that obtained by Eichengreen (2001), who estimated the 
incidence of international crises in a sample of 21 countries for the pre-1914 era and in a 
                                                 
20 Several software packages report standardized principal components.  Within the current context 
however, standardizing the principal components would not be particularly useful. 
21 We continue to use the same sets of countries as in the previous section. 
22 A comparison across groups comprised of differing numbers of countries is complicated by the fact that 
the overall variance in the larger sample is greater.  Hence, all else equal the variance of the crisis index for 
the larger sample will also be greater.  To allow a better comparison across groups, the global crisis indexes 
were appropriately re-scaled.  19
sample of 56 countries for the post-Bretton Woods period and concluded that the 
incidence of international crises has been greater since 1971 than it was before 1913.  
However his approach, in contrast to that taken here, does not differentiate between 
coincident crises in a number of countries in any given year and “connected crises,” i.e. 
crises that were transmitted through various channels or inter-linked through common 
shocks.  Eichengreen’s approach is based on the conclusion from Bordo et. al. (2001) that 
the incidence of crises, as distinct from global crises as defined here, was higher in the 
post-Bretton Woods era relative to the last era of financial integration.  Consequently the 
frequency estimate of the incidence of international crises in Eichengreen (2001), where 
international crises are defined as crises in some minimum number of countries in any 
given year, should suggest a higher incidence in the post-Bretton Woods era. 
Our approach, similar to that in Mody and Taylor (2002), is different, in that international 
crises are defined in terms of a measure of the dependence across the elements of a 
multivariate vector, which captures the degree of exchange market pressure in each 
country.  To this end our reliance on monthly data as opposed to annual data, as in 
Eichengreen (2001), is crucial.  Hence in our approach, international crises are distinct 
from coincident but otherwise unconnected crises, whose repercussions are localized. 
Our aggregate result, that the incidence of international crises was higher in the pre-1914 
era, masks significant differences across the advanced and emerging countries.  From 
Table 2, we find that the likelihood of an international crisis within the advanced 
countries is just as great today as it was in the past.  The key difference across the two 
periods is in the incidence of crises across the set of emerging countries, which has been 
significantly lower in the recent period (for similar evidence see Hartmann et. al. 2002). 
The high incidence of international crises within the four pre-1914 European advanced 
countries is what we might expect, given their strong ties through a system of fixed 
exchange rates, and possibly linkages through commerce.  By similar reasoning the high 
incidence of international crises within today’s advanced countries should not be 
surprising, since our sample is comprised mainly of European countries, which over 
much of the post-Bretton Woods period practiced various forms of exchange rate  20
targeting.  Moreover, our results from the previous section did suggest evidence of strong 
co-movement within the advanced countries. 
Separating the pre-1914 era from today is the higher incidence of international crises 
within the pre-1914 emergers.  The implication of this might be that there were strong 
linkages within these countries, either directly through their ties to gold, or indirectly 
through their ties to the center countries of Europe.  The latter interpretation is supported 
by the results in Table 1, namely that there was a high incidence of global crises across 
the entire sample of pre-1914 countries.  In contrast a significantly lower incidence of 
international crises in recent years, whether we examine the sample as a whole, or restrict 
our attention to the emergers, has two very different implications for the pattern of crisis-
transmission today in comparison with the earlier era. 
First, the inter-linkages between the emerging countries as a whole are weak.  This 
reflects the mixed composition of our sample which spans two regions.  Thus while 
emerging-country-crises may be regional, affecting either just the Asian countries, or just 
the Latin American countries, they are rarely inter-regional.
23  Second, unlike the pre-
1914 era, the inter-linkages between advanced and emerging countries seem to have been 
weaker in recent years.  This is suggested by both the low incidence of international 
crises within the set of emerging countries, as well as across the full sample of countries. 
Thus our findings in this section have implications for the role of advanced countries in 
communicating crises in the past, in comparison to the role they play today.  To get at 
this issue, in the next section we attempt to isolate the international implications of 
shocks to various countries. 
 
5.  Inter-Linkages between Advanced and Emerging 
Countries: Evidence from VAR Analysis 
Our earlier analysis suggested that the relationship between the advanced and emerging 
countries has changed between the first era of globalization before 1914 and today.   
                                                 
23 See the evidence in the previous section and in Murshid (2001), which examines the incidence of crises 
within regional groups, as well as Hartmann et. al. (2002).  21
Perhaps not unrelated to this, we observe a change in the pattern of crisis-transmission: 
crises today are less likely to be global and instead more likely to be regional.  The 
divisions that exist today between advanced and emerging countries, and across regions, 
are underscored in a broad set of correlations in financial variables; the divisions that 
existed in the past are at best blurred.  The implication being, that the inter-relationships 
between the advanced and emerging countries, and between countries across different 
regions, were likely stronger in the past than they are today. 
These distinct patterns of behavior give rise to a number of questions.  How have the 
inter-linkages that existed under the classical gold standard, between the industrialized 
core and the non-industrialized periphery changed?  What are the inter-relationships 
across countries from the same region?  In particular, do they explain the recent patterns 
in crisis-transmission? 
To this end, we estimate a number of vector autoregressions using weekly data on interest 
rates.  VARs provide a framework through which we can analyze the complex dynamics 
that exist between any two variables in a system, by isolating the impact of a shock in one 
variable on another.  By examining impulse response functions, we can obtain a sense of 
these dynamics, and shed light on the extent of transmission effects across pairs of 
countries. 
For the prewar period we examine a sample of six European countries, consisting of three 
advanced—France Germany and the UK—and three emerging countries—Austria, 
Denmark and Italy—observed over a 34-year period from 1880 to 1914.
24  As the US was 
the only non-European country for which we were able to obtain high frequency data, it 
would be difficult to draw any conclusions as to the importance of inter-regional 
linkages, hence our focus on the European countries. 
In contrast the time series for the recent period, while relatively short, covered countries 
from several regions.  For the recent period, we estimate three separate systems: 
                                                 
24 Weekly discount rates were also available for Portugal, Russia and Spain.  Rotating these countries into 
our sample did not qualitatively affect our results, however as the discount rate changed only infrequently 
in these countries, we excluded these nations from our analysis.  22
First we estimate a VAR comprised of six European countries with an even split between 
advanced—France, Germany and the UK—and emerging—the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and the Slovak Republic—thus approximating the makeup of our pre-1914 
sample of countries.
25  Our analysis is carried out over a 6-year period from 1995 to 2001. 
A characteristic distinguishing the countries from the prewar era, were their ties to gold 
and hence their adherence to fixed exchange rates.  To better understand the role of fixed 
exchange rates in communicating shocks we examine the relationships between member 
nations of the European Union over a seven-year period beginning in 1994.  While the 
sample could no longer be split into advanced and emerging, the countries were chosen 
so as to emphasize differences in per capita income.  Thus at one end of the spectrum we 
have France, Germany and the UK, and at the other end we have Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain.
26 
Finally, we examine the scope of inter-linkages within the class of Asian emerging 
countries as well as the impact of the US and Japan on these countries.  Specifically, we 
estimate a VAR for the US, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand.  Our data 
covers a period from 1994 to 2002. 
The output from our VAR analysis is presented in four separate figures in the appendix.  
Figure A1 presents the impulse response graphs for the pre-1914 period, while Figures 
A2-A4 present the analysis for the recent period.  The impulse response functions trace 
out the time profiles of the effects of a one standard deviation innovation to interest rates 
in each country in our sample. 
5.1. Main  Results 
Below we summarize the main conclusions that emerge from each set of regressions: 
                                                 
25 The selection of countries was also based on the length of the time series for each country. 
26 With the exception of the UK the countries in our sample explicitly targeted the exchange rate.   
However, our data starts in 1994, by which point the exchange rate bands had been widened to +/- 15%.  
The exchange rate arrangements subsequently went through a change in January 1999, which effectively 
amounted to a hardening of the exchange rate pegs.  This undoubtedly had implications for the manner in 
which shocks were communicated to these countries however this is not an avenue that we explore.  23
Pre-1914 Period.  In the pre-1914 period, shocks to the advanced countries, in particular 
shocks to the UK and Germany, had a strong and statistically significant impact on the 
other European countries, both advanced and emerging.  In contrast shocks in emerging 
countries did not spillover, although Austria is an exception to this pattern.   
Recent Period, European Countries.  With shocks communicated from Germany to 
France, and from the UK to France and Germany, there is evidence of inter-linkages 
within the set of advanced countries.  In addition, we find evidence of linkages between 
the three transitional nations.  In particular Hungary plays an important role in 
communicating shocks to its neighbors.  Thus while relationships within either the group 
of advanced or transitional countries are evident, there is no indication of any inter-
linkages between these two groups. 
Recent Period, European Union.  Within the European Union, Germany appears to be 
the dominant country, with shocks to Germany being communicated to the other member 
nations—Greece being the only exception.  In contrast shocks to France in particular, but 
also the UK, have a limited effect.  While there appears to be some evidence of inter-
linkages between these big-three nations of Europe, it is clear that the driving force is 
Germany.  Within the smaller three—Spain, Portugal and Greece—there is some 
evidence of spillovers.  However, the big three countries remain insulated from these 
shocks.  Thus the association between the advanced and emerging countries is largely 
unidirectional.  
Recent Period, Asian Countries.  The evidence of inter-linkages in our sample 
consisting of Asian emergers, Japan and the US, is far weaker than what we observe for 
the European nations.  Over the period of investigation, the currencies of the Asian 
emerging countries were, to varying degrees, linked to the dollar.  Consequently we 
would expect, and do observe some evidence of transmission from the US to these 
countries.  In particular, we find that shocks to US interest rates are communicated to 
both Japan and Hong Kong and to a much lesser extent to Korea also.  Although Japan 
was the dominant economic power in that region, shocks to Japanese interest rates were 
not communicated to the neighboring Asian countries, or for that matter the US.  Within  24
the sample of emerging countries, we observe little evidence of cross-border 
transmission, except in the case of Korea. 
A number of conclusions emerge from our analysis, which we summarize below: 
5.2. Implications 
Inter-Linkages between Advanced Countries. Both in the past and more recently, 
inter-linkages within the advanced countries have been evident.  Consistent with the 
evidence in Lindert (1969), we find that the UK was the dominant country through which 
shocks were communicated under the pre-1914 gold standard, although the relationship 
was mutually reinforcing, as e.g. shocks to Germany also impacted on the UK.
27  Today 
we observe a similar pattern of inter-linkages within the advanced countries of Europe 
and also evidence of transmission from the US to Japan. 
Inter-Linkages between Emerging Countries.  The evidence of spillovers within the 
class of emerging countries is weaker than what we observe for the advanced countries, 
although not completely absent.  In particular, in the pre-1914 era, shocks originating in 
Austria appear to have spilled over affecting advanced and emerging countries alike.  
More recently cross-border transmission within the transitional countries of Europe is 
also evident.   
Inter-Linkages between Advanced and Emerging Countries.  The evidence of inter-
linkages between advanced and emerging countries is mixed and needs to be qualified.  
In the first instance, the relationships between advanced and emerging countries are often 
unidirectional.  Thus in the pre-1914 era, a shock to the UK had a ripple effect on all the 
other countries in our sample, however, the UK was insulated from shocks in emerging 
countries.  While in recent years, shocks to Germany have had a similar effect on the 
European Union but shocks to the smaller European nations have not had a significant 
influence on Germany.  There have obviously been exceptions to this pattern, with pre-
1914 Austria being a notable example. 
                                                 
27 Also see Tullio and Walters (1996).  25
Second, evidence of inter-relationships between the advanced and emerging countries is 
weaker outside of the European Union.  While there is some evidence of cross-border 
transmission from the US to the Asian countries which maintained pegs with the dollar, 
this evidence is weak.  Moreover, there is no evidence of transmission from Japan to the 
Asian countries. 
Inter-Linkages within Regions.  Our analysis of the pre-1914 European nations 
suggests that regional transmission may have been an important factor through which 
financial shocks were communicated.  However, it is difficult to separate the importance 
of regional ties, over the other influences, such as the exchange rate regime, without a 
benchmark as to the pattern of behavior.  We will however note that in a system which 
includes the US, there was evidence of transmission from the UK to the US and from the 
US to the UK.
28 
In the recent period, we do find evidence of regional transmission within Europe and 
Asia.  Again it is difficult to isolate the importance of regional ties.  However, within the 
Asian emergers, the evidence of regional patterns is far weaker.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to examine the pattern of dependence in financial 
variables using a number of different approaches, from which we are able to arrive at a 
number of conclusions. 
•   First, tight patterns in co-movement in bond yield spreads across all countries are 
evident during both the pre-1914 era and the 1990s.  However, in the recent era, the 
co-movement is less global and more concentrated within each of the advanced and 
emerging countries treated as separate groups. 
•   Second, the incidence of global crises in the pre-1914 era was higher than what is 
observed today.  This reflects a lower incidence of international crises within the 
                                                 
28 We do not report these results.  However, they are available upon request.  26
emerging countries, where crises have tended to be regional.  In contrast, within the 
advanced countries, the incidence of international crises today has been just as high as 
it was in the past. 
•   Third, before 1914, financial shocks were largely transmitted in one direction—from 
the advanced countries of Europe (especially the U.K.) to the emergers.  Today, 
shocks are transmitted internationally within advanced countries however evidence of 
transmission from advanced to emerging countries is weaker. 
The evidence of strong co-movement in spreads is not unexpected.  An implication of 
increased financial and trade integration has been stronger interdependence between 
nations.  Under the classical gold standard, the degree of this dependence increased over 
time as countries became more integrated and as global trends in prices sparked a decline 
in spreads.  Moreover the inability in the pre-1914 era to distinguish distinct patterns in 
co-movement within subsets of countries, suggested the possibility of inter-linkages 
across regions and between advanced and emerging countries.  In recent years, though we 
observe similar levels of co-movement in spreads, the correspondence is largely within 
groups, separated into advanced and emerging categories.  This reflects the divergent 
experiences across these two groups in the aftermath of the recent crises. 
The higher incidence of crises in the pre-1914 era is perhaps also not surprising.  There 
were a number of important factors which helped to define the nature of crises in the past.  
First shocks and crises were communicated through gold flows.  Second, adherence to 
gold convertibility implied subordinating all other policy objectives.  The peg to gold 
therefore acted like “golden fetters” amplifying the effects of a negative shock 
(Eichengreen 1992).  Moreover, even the advanced countries from that era, had not 
completely developed the tools to provide financial stability.  Third, prior to World War 
I, financial power was concentrated in a handful of Western European countries, which 
were the major creditors of that era.  In addition to exporting capital, these countries also 
provided export markets to the emergers.  A crisis at the center therefore exposed the 
periphery to reinforcing shocks on the current and capital accounts (Eichengreen 1996).  
Consequently, as our VAR evidence suggests, in the past there were strong inter-linkages  27
between advanced and emerging countries.  In contrast today, a large diverse group of 
countries now constitutes the center.  Consequently emerging markets are subject to 
various influences and are less prone to disturbances in any one part of the center. 
The high incidence of crises within today’s advanced countries reflects in part the 
composition of countries in our sample, which includes primarily member countries of 
the European Union.  This is consistent with our VAR evidence, which has suggested the 
presence of strong inter-linkages between advanced countries; in particular shocks to 
Germany are communicated strongly throughout Europe.  The pattern is weaker for 
advanced countries in general, but is not inconsistent with the possibility of a tight 
correspondence in macroeconomic fundamentals associated with an international 
business cycle.  Clearly advanced countries, in particular countries of the European 
Union, have not been immune to speculative attacks, however, importantly today’s 
advanced-country-crises have had a more limited effect on output relative to earlier crises 
(Bordo et. al. 2001).  Consequently their propensity to spill over into global crises has 
diminished. 
Within today’s emerging countries, crises have suggested an overwhelmingly regional 
pattern (see also evidence in Glick and Rose 1999, Hartmann et. al. 2002).  Perhaps this 
is indicative of trade linkages (Glick and Rose 1999).  However, as was implied from our 
VAR analysis, the evidence of a tight intra-regional correspondence in fundamentals 
between emerging countries is somewhat weaker than for advanced countries. 
What then explains the pattern of emerging-market crises?  Weaknesses in financial 
systems and a lack of transparency in emerging financial markets, has possibly 
heightened their vulnerability to shocks and increased the possibility of contagion.  The 
regional pattern in emerging-market crises then simply corresponds to an unbalanced 
pattern in financial distress.  Recent experience suggests that the reversal of capital flows 
that accompany crises is often most acute in the region where the crisis originates 
(Eichengreen et. al. 2001).  For other countries, the crisis typically represents only a 
discrete interruption in capital-market access.  Hence a cross-regional pattern in crisis-
transmission is typically not observed (Eichengreen 2001).    28
Following a brief lull behind barriers to international capital movements under the 
Bretton Woods system, international financial crises have again begun to reassert 
themselves (Bordo et. al. 2001).  Thus the restrictions on capital account transactions (as 
well as those on current account transactions prior to 1958), are key to understanding 
why crises were contained under Bretton Woods (Bordo et. al. 2001, Eichengreen 2001, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).  But even when comparing two eras of globalization, 
sharp contrasts in both the scope and manner in which shocks and crises were 
communicated are evident.  Our analysis cannot provide definitive answers as to what 
underlies the greater stability across financial markets in the last few decades relative to 
the previous era of globalization.  However, severing the links to gold, the adoption of a 
managed floating regime, the growing financial maturity of advanced countries, and the 
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Table 1 Incidence of Global Crises over a Six-Month Period, 1880-1914 and 1975-
2000 
Prewar  Post Bretton Woods 




0.12 0.09 0.02 0.02 
a Probability estimates were obtained by fitting a generalized extreme value distribution to the semi-annual 
maxima of the global crisis index. 
 
Table 2 Incidence of International Crises over a Six-Month Period, Within the Set of 
Advanced Countries and within the set of Emerging Countries, 1880-1913 and 1975-
2000 
Prewar  Post Bretton Woods 
Advanced Emerging Advanced Emerging 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Freq. EVM
a Freq.  EVM
a Freq.  EVM
a Freq.  EVM
a 
0.21 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.03 
a Probability estimates were obtained by fitting a generalized extreme value distribution to the semi-annual 
maxima of the global crisis index. 
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a Spreads for selected countries. 
 
 
Figure 2B. Spreads Over 30-Year US T-Bonds: 1994-2000 
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Figure 4A. Factor Loadings, Spreads Data, 1880-1914 
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Figure 4C. Factor Loadings, Spreads Data, 1994-2000 
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Figure 6A. Factor Loadings, EMP, 1880-1914 
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Figure 6B. Factor Loadings, EMP, 1975-2000 
 
 
Figure 7A. Global Crisis Index, 1880-1914 
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Figure 7B. Global Crisis Index, 1975-2000 
  
Appendix 
A.1.  Impulse Response Function, Advanced and Emerging European Countries: 3/21/1885 1/02/1914
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____________________ 
1VAR estimated using eigh t lags.  The number of lags was obtained by initially estimating a system with twelve lags and 
then sequentially paring down the model through a set of nested hypothesis tests.  The variables were ordered as follows: 
UK, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Denmark.  
A.2. Impulse Response Function, Advanced and Emerging European Countries: 10/26/1995 
9/27/2001
1 
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Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.







20 40 60 80 100







20 40 60 80 100







20 40 60 80 100







20 40 60 80 100







20 40 60 80 100








20 40 60 80 100
Response of SLV to FRA
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 









20 40 60 80 100









20 40 60 80 100






20 40 60 80 100







20 40 60 80 100










20 40 60 80 100






20 40 60 80 100
Response of SLV to UK
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.








20 40 60 80 100








20 40 60 80 100






20 40 60 80 100








20 40 60 80 100









20 40 60 80 100









20 40 60 80 100
Response of SLV to HUN
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____________________ 
1VAR estimated using seven lags.  The number of lags was obtained by initially estimating a system with twelve lags and 
then sequentially paring down the model through a set of nested hypothesis tests.  The variables were ordered as follows: 
Germany, France, UK, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic.  
A.3. Impulse Response Function, European Union Member Nations: 10/27/1994-12/27/2001
1 
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Response of GRC to GER
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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____________________ 
1VAR estimated using eight lags.  The number of lags was obtained by initially estimating a system with twelve lags and 
then sequentially paring down the model through a set of nested hypothesis tests.  The variables were ordered as follows: 
Germany, France, UK, Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
A.4. Impulse Response Function, Asian Emergers, Japan and the US: 3/10/1994-2/21/2002
1 
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Response of THAI to USA
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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____________________ 
1VAR estimated using two lags.  The number of lags was obtained by initially estimating a system with 
twelve lags and then sequentially paring down the model through a set of nested hypothesis tests.  The 
variables were ordered as follows: USA, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Thailand. 